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Abstract: 
This paper uses 1988-1991 state-level data to examine the effects of tax policy, income, and sociopolitical char-
acteristics on charitable contributions to international relief and development. Unlike assistance to domestic 
religious, educational, cultural, health, and social welfare institutions, donations to organizations that primarily 
benefit foreigners provide no direct consumption value to the donor and are not subject to crowding-out by state 
and local governments. The paper finds that this type of charitable giving is sensitive to changes in both income 
and tax rates. The educational composition, age distribution, religiousness, and political orientation of each state 
are also important determinants of donative behavior. 
 
Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past 20 years, economists have devoted considerable effort to investigating the determinants of private 
charitable giving. Research interest in charitable behavior stems from several sources. First, total annual 
contributions to charitable organizations represent a sizeable amount. Individuals donated $103 billion or 
roughly 1.8 percent of GNP in 1991 (Kaplan, 1992). Second, from a methodological perspective, evidence on 
charitable behavior informs the development of theoretical economic models of public goods provision and 
altruism. Third, there is interest in the effects of tax policy on donative behavior. Private charitable giving, 
which cost the federal government $15.7 billion in 1991 (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1992), is 
thought to be sensitive to tax policy. Indeed, previous studies have generally reported price elasticities in the 
range of —1.0 to —1.5 (Clotfelter, 1985, 1990). Unfortunately, unresolved statistical issues exist in much of 
this literature, and the tax sensitivity of contributions to specific types of organizations has been only lightly 
researched. 
 
This study examines the effects of interstate variation in tax policy, income, demographic characteristics, and 
political attitudes on private giving to international relief and development organizations (IRDOs). The analysis 
uses 1988-91 longitudinal state-level data collected directly from eight of the largest IRDOs. These data have 
several advantages relative to the data used in previous analyses. 
 
Most notably, the data describe contributions to a specific type of charity. Much of the existing empirical 
research on tax sensitivity relies on federal tax data on charitable deductions (e.g., Clotfelter and Steuerle, 1981; 
Broman, 1989; Slemrod, 1989). These studies implicitly consider a composite good comprised of gifts intended 
for many different uses such as religious, artistic, educational, medical, or social improvement. Giving in each 
of these areas may reflect different intensities of benevolence. Specifically, some donors derive direct 
consumption benefits from the goods and services that certain organizations provide. For example, contributors 
to religious institutions may benefit from worship services and the services of clergy; contributors to artistic 
organizations may attend exhibitions and performances. In each of these cases, donors could be modeled as 
having preferences over the consumption of some set of local public goods. Alternatively, donors may receive 
no immediate consumption benefits from the organizations they support but may, instead, be motivated by the 
possibility of future needs and benefits. Gifts to medical research, volunteer fire departments, and social welfare 
organizations may be influenced by such insurance considerations. A third motivation might be the satisfaction 
that individuals derive from the act of gift- giving or more specifically from the social approval associated with 
gift-giving. Finally, individuals may behave in a purely altruistic manner—i.e., the utility of other individuals 
may enter donors' own utility functions as public goods. Contributions to a particular charity 
may depend on several motives. For example, Andreoni (1990) combines interdependent utility and joy-of-
giving motivations in his model of "impure altruism." 
 
To the extent that composite giving reflects a mixture of all of the forgoing motives, estimates based on tax 
records or broadly aggregated donations reveal little about the demand parameters associated with particular 
motives. In contrast, IRDOs provide virtually no assistance to U.S. residents; hence, contributions to these 
organizations should not be influenced by consumption or insurance motives. Thus, this paper examines gifts 
that are motivated by either a pure or impure model of altruism. 
 
Disaggregating contributions to IRDOs by state confers additional advantages. The use of longitudinal cross-
section state data allows us to introduce variation in state tax rates and, consequently, variation in the effective 
price of charity. Unlike many previous studies that relied solely on cross-section variation in federal tax rates, 
our tax price measures incorporate a source of variation that is independent of the variation in income and 
should yield robust estimates of the tax sensitivity of charitable giving. Additionally, because state governments 
do not provide assistance to foreign countries, the cross-section data reduce the difficulties in controlling for 
possible government crowd-out effects. 
 
Finally, the data are contemporary and may be more accurate than the information used in previous analyses. 
The paper's observations are calculated directly from the computerized donor databases of the participating 
IRDOs. Unlike tax records, these data include contributions from both itemizers and nonitemizers. Because the 
data are obtained from administrative records, they are not subject to recall error. Furthermore, there are no 
financial, social, or psychological incentives to over-report contributions, as might exist with tax or survey 
data.
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This study finds that giving to IRDOs is generally sensitive to changes in tax rates and incomes, with estimates 
of absolute elasticities exceeding 1.5 in many specifications. The results are robust to different definitions of the 
tax price variable, alternative functional specifications, and the inclusion of demographic, ideological, and 
regional controls. The results hold in separate years and for most of the individual organizations. The finding of 
elastic price and income responses is consistent with the interpretation of contributions to IRDOs as 
representing acts of either pure or impure benevolence. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous empirical research on charitable 
behavior. The econometric methodology and data are described in the third section. The fourth section reports 
and interprets the econometric results. Concluding remarks appear in the final section. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The empirical research on private charitable giving has been extensively reviewed by Clotfelter (1985, 1990) 
and is only briefly summarized here. Most studies have examined composite contributions aggregated across a 
variety of charitable activities. Although there have been some exceptions, the majority of these analyses have 
found contributions to be moderately price elastic.
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 In contrast, these same studies have almost universally 
concluded that contributions are inelastic with respect to income. 
 
To our knowledge, no empirical economic study has focused on gifts motivated exclusively by either pure or 
impure altruism, and only two have explicitly considered social welfare donations. In separate analyses using 
very different data sets and methods, Feldstein (1975) and Reece (1979) found that private contributions to 
social welfare organizations were moderately sensitive to changes in prices and incomes.
3
 Although carefully 
done, the results of both studies (and much of the contributions literature) may be compromised by two 
statistical issues related to their use of cross-section variation in the federal tax rate to generate price variation. 
First, there may be a problem in the identification of price effects. The use of differences in the federal tax rate, 
which are driven primarily by variations in income, to identify price effects implicitly requires a functional 
restriction on income. In light of this, Feenberg (1987) has suggested using variation in local tax rates to 
identify price effects.
4
 
 
Second, estimates of the price elasticity of contributions directed toward the provision of a public good may be 
biased toward zero if similarly directed government expenditures increase taxes and crowd out private 
contributions. In theory, crowd-out bias can be corrected by including both the tax price and the appropriate 
category of government spending as regressors. Unfortunately, a practical problem arises in defining the 
relevant component of government spending.
5
 In macro-level analyses, correction becomes even more difficult 
as government expenditures may no longer be exogenous. 
 
Kingma's (1989) analysis of contributions to a narrowly defined public good, National Public Radio (NPR), 
provides one model of how the issues of identification and crowding-out might be addressed. In his study, price 
effects were identified through cross-section variation in state tax rates; government funding of NPR provided 
an appropriate measure of crowd-out. Kingma found a small and statistically insignificant price elasticity. 
 
This paper offers a slightly different empirical strategy. Like Kingma, we consider donations to a particular 
activity, international relief and development, and incorporate variation in state tax rates as a price control. 
However, because state governments do not engage in foreign assistance, our measure of charitable giving is 
unaffected by crowding-out at the local level. A series of time dummies suffices to control for year-to-year 
differences in federal development assistance. 
 
THE MODEL AND DATA 
Charitable giving is modeled as isoelastic with respect to prices and income and linear in the other explanatory 
variables. Specifically, per capita contributions to IRDOs in state j for year t, gjt, are assumed to follow  
 
 
 
where pit is the tax price, yjt is per capita disposable income, Xjt is a vector of other explanatory variables, and εjt 
represents unobserved variation. The paper first examines standard OLS estimates of the parameters in equation 
1. OLS is consistent if εjt is independent of the observed variables and efficient if fit is homoskedastic and 
serially uncorrelated. The robustness of the OLS estimates to alternative functional specifications and error 
assumptions is subsequently examined. 
 
The paper's contributions data were collected directly through a survey of IRDOs. Ten organizations were con-
tacted; none refused our request for information, and eight provided usable data.
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  Each of the surveyed IRDOs 
maintains a database of donors, their contributions, and addresses, making a breakdown of gifts by state 
possible. The organizations drew individual cash contributions information from their databases, summed the 
data by state and year, and provided us with the aggregated results. 
 
Several of the organizations have requested anonymity. To facilitate discussion where there is a need to 
describe a particular organization, the IRDOs have been randomly assigned the letters A through H. Overall, the 
organizations can be characterized as follows. Each organization operates foreign assistance programs in the 
tens of millions of dollars. Each uses a large majority of its program resources for foreign, rather than domestic, 
programs.
7
 Each enjoys widespread name recognition and is strongly associated with international relief and 
development. The organizations include secular, religiously oriented, and denominationally affiliated charities. 
Private cash contributions to the eight organizations in the sample totaled $370 million in 1990. 
 
While our contributions data possess advantages relative to the data used in earlier studies, they also have some 
limitations. First, the data do not include in- kind contributions. However, this may not be a severe problem 
because the surveyed organizations received most of their donations in the form of cash.
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 Second, although 
some organizations provided complete records for the entire period 1988-91, others were only able to report 
data for two or three years. Specifically, data for the years 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991 are available from four, 
seven, eight, and six organizations, respectively. Most of the results reported in this paper are based on in-
formation from the two-year period 1989-90 for which seven organizations provided complete data. Finally, 
some contributions could not be assigned to a particular state (i.e., contributions from overseas military 
personnel, residents of the U.S. territories, and nonresidents generally). The data we were able to collect 
represent, on average, 89 percent of the individual contributions listed in the organizations' annual reports. 
 
The independent variables are developed from standard sources. State and federal tax provisions are used to 
determine the effective price of charity (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1989-92 and 
various state personal income tax forms). The price measure accounts for the federal deductibility of charitable 
contributions and state taxes. Several states, in turn, also allow taxpayers to deduct contributions or federal 
taxes from their state payments. In general, the tax price of charity can be expressed  
 
 
where ft is the federal marginal tax rate, sjt is the state marginal rate ijt equals  one if the state permits itemized 
deduction of charitable contributions and equals zero otherwise, and djt  is the  fraction of federal taxes the state 
permits as a deduction.
9
 
 
Because the analysis examines aggregate state-level data, there is no clear choice regarding exactly which 
marginal tax rates should be used. Therefore, equation 1 is estimated under several alternative specifications of 
pjt. The baseline specification selects sjt as the rate for married-joint filers at a taxable income equal to state j's 
average federal taxable income in year t. 
10 
Complete details of  the construction of the sit appear in Appendix 
A.
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To determine the sensitivity of the paper's estimates to potential problems in the baseline calculation, three other 
specifications of pjt  are examined. First, the state tax rates are purged of cross- state income variation by 
selecting sit as the marginal rate at the national average family income. This procedure eliminates possible "last 
dollar" endogeneity bias (Reece and Zieschang, 1985) but may also decrease the efficiency of the price 
estimate. A second price measure is formed using the states' maximum tax rates. This measure is also 
independent of cross-state income variation and might better reflect the tax price for individuals near the top of 
the income distribution than the other two "average" income measures.
12
 Finally, the itemization rule ijt, is itself 
used as a proxy for  the price of charity. 
 
The other independent variables collected for each state include the per capita disposable income (U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, 1994), percentage of the population of African descent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1988), percentage with a college degree (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991, 1992), percentage over age 65 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1988), percentage who are church members (Bradley et a/., 1992), and a political index 
summarizing the voting records of the state's Congressional delegation (Americans for Democratic Action, 
1989-92). The disposable income variable has an obvious economic interpretation. The other measures are used 
as controls for cross-state differences in institutions, preferences, and resources. For example, education is a 
proxy for both permanent income and an increased awareness of international needs; the church membership 
variable may capture the effects of either generosity or competing charitable demands (Independent Sector, 
1990). All of these measures are available longitudinally with the exception of church membership, which is 
only reported for 1990. 
 
Summary statistics for the independent variables and for total contributions to the seven charities that supplied 
complete 1989-90 data appear in Table 1. Table 1 lists means and standard deviations for all of the variables as 
well as correlations between the independent and dependent variables. The data have been weighted to reflect 
the relative populations of the states. All dollar amounts in the table and subsequent regressions have been 
deflated to 1987 levels using the implicit GNP price deflator for personal consumption expenditures. To provide 
more detail on the primary variables of interest, a state-bystate listing of total contributions, disposable incomes, 
and tax prices for 1990 appears in Table 2. 
 
The descriptive data reveal that aggregate annual per capita giving to the surveyed IRDOs averaged roughly one 
dollar ($0.99 in 1989-90 data for seven organizations, $1.10 in the 1990 data for all eight organizations) with 
substantial variation across states. The average tax prices of a one-dollar contribution calculated using the 
baseline, national average income, and maximum tax rate methods were $0.82, $0.70, and $0.64, respectively. 
Charitable contributions were deductible in nearly two-thirds of the states containing 55 percent of the U.S. 
population. Overall, tax prices varied within a narrow band across states and were negatively correlated with 
charita- 
 
 
ble giving. Turning to the other independent variables, per capita disposable income, education, and liberal 
ideology were positively correlated with contributions, while African origin, older populations, and church 
membership were negatively associated with giving to IRDOs. In general, the results for these other variables 
conform with expectations. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 reports estimates from four specifications of equation 1 using data from organizations that reported data 
for both 1989 and 1990. The first column lists estimates from a simple OLS regression that includes disposable 
income, the baseline tax price, and a time dummy as independent variables. The results indicate that these few 
variables explain a large proportion of the total variation in charitable giving. Contributions in this specification 
appear to be very sensitive to income and tax price changes. However, the time dummy, which is included to 
capture effects of annual changes in international and domestic conditions as well as potential federal crowd-out 
effects, is insignificant. Although evidence based on a single time dummy is hardly compelling, the coefficient 
is consistent with findings of weak crowd-out effects reported by Abrams and Schmitz (1984) and Clotfelter 
(1985). 
 
The next specification in Table 3 introduces demographic, religious, and ideological variables as controls for 
variation in tastes and preferences. The added variables are jointly significant. Donations appear to be larger in 
states with more 
 
educated and politically liberal residents than other states and lower in states with larger proportions of black 
residents. Church membership and the state's age distribution do not appear to be significant determinants. 
Adding the preference shifters causes the magnitudes of the income and price coefficients to diminish by about 
one-third. The absolute values of both elasticity point estimates are still greater than one; however, neither is 
significantly different from one. The coefficient on the time dummy remains small and insignificant. 
 
The third column lists results from a model that appends regional dummy variables to the list of controls. The 
region dummies capture effects of time- invariant differences in preferences and institutions not picked up by 
the other taste shifters. Although the added variables are jointly and individually significant, their inclusion has 
only modest effects on the other coefficients. Specifically, the coefficients on income, college education, and 
political attitudes maintain their magnitudes, signs, and levels of significance. The tax price and racial 
composition coefficients lose their significance (the price elasticity actually dips below one) but remain close to 
their previous values. 
 
The final specification in Table 3 takes advantage of the longitudinal aspects of the data and replaces the region 
dummies with state-specific random effects. The random effects procedure controls for omitted time-invariant 
factors that are orthogonal to the other independent variables. If this type of unobserved state-specific 
heterogeneity is present, the procedure should increase the efficiency of the estimates relative to OLS and 
generate more appropriate standard errors.
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 The income and political ideology coefficients are essentially un-
changed in the random effects specification. The coefficient on tax price increases in magnitude and regains its 
significance. The coefficient on church membership also becomes significantly negative, while the coefficient 
on college education loses its significance. Examining the results from Table 3 as a whole, the estimated income 
elasticity is significant and 1.5 or higher in all four specifications; the price elasticity is significant and less than 
—1.0 in three specifications.
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In the next table, the regressions from Table 3 are all reestimated using the three alternative tax price measures 
discussed in the previous section. Because the respecifications had no substantial effects on the results for the 
sociopolitical controls, Table 4 reports only the coefficients for the income and price variables. For the 
specifications in the first two rows, the economic coefficients are similar in sign, significance, and magnitude to 
the estimates from Table 3 and do not to be appear sensitive to the choice of tax rate in the price calculations. If 
anything, both sets of respecifications lead to slightly stronger price elasticities. The regressions in the last row 
of Table 4 each replace the tax price with a dummy variable indicating whether the state allows deductions for 
itemized contributions. Although the dummy variable coefficients are not directly comparable with the other 
price coefficients, the pattern of estimates is consistent with our previous results.
15 
 
So far, the analysis has only examined a particular aggregation of the charitable expenditures data over a 
particular two- year period. The next two tables consider different definitions of the contributions variable as 
well as data from different years. Estimates based on alternative aggregation schemes appear in Table 5. The 
first four rows of Table 5 list results from random effects models, which aggregate the contributions data to 
produce consistent groupings across different time spans. Estimates from OLS models, which aggregate all of 
the available data for single years, appear in the next four rows of Table 5.
16
 To facilitate comparison, the table 
lists the average level of per capita aggregate charitable expenditures under each scheme. 
 
The estimates in the first row of Table 5 describe the determinants of aggregate giving for the years 1988-91. 
Data over this period are available for only three IRDOs. However, contributions to these organizations account 
for nearly 70 percent of the previous (1989-90) aggregate. Estimation reveals some differences between these 
and our earlier results. The estimated income elasticity from the 1988-91 data is significantly positive, though 
smaller than the estimates from the other tables. The estimated price elasticity is insignificant but nearly the 
same as the corresponding estimate from Table 3. Among the sociopolitical variables, church membership again 
has a significant negative effect on contributions, and political ideology maintains its significant positive effect. 
The coefficient on elderly residents becomes significantly positive, while the other demographic variables 
remain insignificant. Lastly, the time dummies are found to be jointly significant. 
 
The next three rows present regression results for the years 1988-90, 1989-91, 
 
and 1990-1; the dependent variables for these regressions represent contributions to four, five, and six IRDOs, 
respectively. Each specification produces significantly positive income elasticities, with two of three point 
estimates exceeding 1.0. Two of the specifications generate strong and significantly negative price elasticities. 
These same two specifications (1989-91 and 1990-1) also contain significant time dummies. Although there are 
some changes in magnitudes and significance levels, the estimated sociopolitical effects are mostly consistent 
with the results presented earlier. 
 
Results for aggregate contributions for the individual years 1988-91 appear in the last four rows of Table 5. The 
estimated income elasticities in these specifications are all significant and greater than 1.5. The price elasticities 
are all larger in magnitude than the corresponding estimate from Table 3; however, only one coefficient is 
significantly negative. The coefficients on college education and political ideology are significant in two 
equations each, while the other demographic controls are all insignificant. 
 
Separate random effects regression results for the individual IRDOs appear in Table 6.
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 Organization 
identifiers and figures describing the data availability and average annual per capita contributions for each 
IRDO are listed in the first three columns. The estimation results in the next column indicate that income has 
significant positive effects on contributions for six of the eight IRDOs (insignificant or negative effects appear 
only for the two denominationally affiliated organizations). Elastic income responses appear for four of the 
organizations. The price coefficients are negative for six of 
 
the IRDOs and significantly negative for three. Each of the significant coefficients indicates an elastic price 
response. Some variation appears in the estimated demographic and attitudinal parameters across organizations. 
However, the significant coefficients are all consistent in sign with the estimates from previous tables. 
 
Conclusions 
This study investigates the effects of tax policy, incomes, and sociopolitical characteristics on private giving to 
international relief and development organizations. Using a new data set that disaggregates contributions by 
state, the study finds that donations to IRDOs are sensitive to changes in incomes and tax prices. Itemization 
itself also appears to have a clear effect: states that permit charitable deductions contribute more to IRDOs than 
states that do not permit deductions. A battery of tests indicates that the paper's income and price results are 
fairly robust to respecification of the variables, functional forms, time spans, and aggregation methods. 
 
Overall, the paper reports income and price effects that are on the high end of those found by previous studies 
that examined general charitable contributions. Several factors might explain this result. First, unlike previous 
research, this study examines contributions to a narrow set of organizations, which provide neither consumption 
nor insurance benefits to donors. Contributions motivated by purely benevolent intentions or by preferences for 
gift-giving may have more of 
 
the qualities of a luxury good than contributions motivated by less altruistic intentions. Second, the differences 
in findings may be explained by the inability of some earlier studies to adequately identify price effects and 
control for crowd- out biases. This paper's use of disaggregated data provides a sound basis for identifying price 
effects. In particular, cross-state variation in tax rates induces variation in the effective price of charity. 
Moreover, because state governments do not provide development assistance to foreign countries, this variation 
is not confounded by crowd- out effects. 
 
Finally, there are several policy implications that follow from the paper's results. The high price elasticity 
suggests that IRDOs would benefit from an expansion of the tax deduction granted to donors and that these 
organizations may have been adversely affected by the tax reform of the 1980s. The strong elasticity estimates 
further imply that, at the margin, tax breaks reduce government revenues by less than the amount of the gifts 
themselves. Hence, in terms of raising funds for international relief and development, it may be more efficient 
to expand tax incentives than to increase direct government expenditures on assistance. 
 
APPENDIX A 
COMPUTATION OF STATE TAX RATES 
This appendix describes the three alternative determinations of state tax rates. The baseline tax rates for 1989-
91 are evaluated at each state's average federal taxable income. Average taxable income data are not available 
for 1988; consequently, the paper uses the following approximation: 
 
Taxable incomej,88 = average adjusted gross incomej,88 
— (average number of 
exemptionsj,88 
x exemption amount88) 
(percent itemizersj,88 
x average itemized deductionj,88) 
(percent nonitemizersj,88 
x standard deduction88). 
 
The averages necessary for equation A.1 are available from the Internal Revenue Service (1990-4). The second 
set of tax rates are those in effect at a taxable income equal to the national average family income ($38,608, 
$41,506, $42,652, and $43,237 in 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, respectively). The third set of tax rates are the 
maximum rates in each state. In each case, tax rates for the married-joint filing status are used. Nine states did 
not have special tax rates for joint filers, but did allow married taxpayers the advantage of filing separately on 
the same return. For these states, we select the tax rate as if all income had been earned by one spouse, rather 
than splitting the income between spouses. 
 
Several states have tax policies that require special treatment. When states tax different components of income 
at different rates, we form an effective marginal rate equal to the weighted average of the various rates using the 
share of each income component in taxable income as the weight. Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
and Tennessee require this modification. Maryland's tax rate includes the 50 percent surcharge in effect in most 
counties. Ohio's rate is reduced by the joint filing credit (five to 20 percent depending on income). For Kansas 
and Oklahoma, there are two potential rate schedules—a lower schedule that does not permit federal taxes to be 
deducted and a higher schedule that does permit deductions. The reported results use each state's lower 
schedules (the use of the higher schedules had no noticeable effect on the results). Oregon's limited deductibility 
for federal taxes enters into the calculation of its baseline tax price but not into its other tax prices. Finally, 
Wisconsin's five percent tax credit for charitable contributions is used to calculate its tax price. 
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1. Comparisons of audited and unaudited tax data suggest that estimates of the price elasticity may not be 
much affected by misreporting (Slemrod, 1989). 
2. Exceptions include the smaller price elasticities estimated from panel data (Clotfelter, 1980; Broman, 
1989) and the larger elasticities estimated from the 1973 National Survey of Philanthropy (Boskin, and 
Feldstein, 1977; Schiff, 1990). There have also been larger (Slemrod, 1989) and smaller (Glenday, 
Gupta, and Pawlak, 1986) elasticities estimated from cross- section tax data. Steinberg (1990) reviewed 
this recent research. 
3. Feldstein used 1962 federal tax data to aggregate charitable contributions by income of the donor and 
type of charity (i.e., religious, educational, medical, health/welfare), while Reece combined 1972-3 
Consumer Expenditure Survey information on contributions that were directly deducted from paychecks 
with data on giving to organizations like the Red Cross and United Fund (now the United Way). 
4. Bogart and Gentry (forthcoming) apply this methodology in their analysis of capital gains realizations. 
Alternatively, identification might be achieved through time series variation in federal tax rates. 
5. Based on regressions of aggregate private giving on government welfare expenditures, Abrams and 
Schmitz (1984) and Clotfelter (1985) concluded that crowd-out biases were small. However, given that 
private social welfare contributions represent only a fraction of total charitable giving (Kaplan, 1992), 
these studies considered but a portion of the potential crowd-out effect. 
6. Data from one organization were not used because of its policy of returning a percentage of all 
donations to social welfare charities operating in the locality from which the donations originated. 
Another organization provided only partially disaggregated data. 
7. On average, the ratio of foreign program expenditure to foreign plus domestic expenditures was 97 
percent. Some well-known organizations do not satisfy this requirement. For instance, the American 
National Red Cross spends about $10 million in overseas programs (via the International Red Cross/Red 
Crescent), but this amount represents only four percent of its total program budget. 
8. One charity received half of its contributions in cash, and the rest received 75 percent or more in cash. 
Most in-kind contributions are not from individuals but from the government (e.g., food under Public 
Law 480), business donations (air travel, medical supplies), and churches. 
9.  Let a one-dollar charitable contribution reduce federal and state taxes by Ft and Sjt respectively. Hence, 
Ft = (1 — Sjt) ft, and Sjt = (ijt — djtFt)sjt. Using these equations to solve for Sjt and Ft and substituting into 
the equation for the tax price of giving, pjt = 1 — Sjt — Ft,, leads to equation 2. 
10. 1° Although the number of married-joint and single filers on federal returns is nearly the same, married 
people make about five times more itemized charitable contributions (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 
1990-4). Similarly, the Independent Sector (1990) found the average gift of married households to be 
$1,132, compared to $654 for single households. 
11. The baseline tax price calculation introduces several potential sources of error. First, average taxable 
income for state personal income taxes does not usually conform to that state's average federal taxable 
income. This is a minor concern as long as the error is small enough to prevent crossing a state tax 
bracket. Second, not all contributors itemize; hence, a weighted index in which nonitemizers have a tax 
price of one might be more appropriate. Unfortunately, data on the number of itemizers on state returns 
are not available (an index based on the percentage of federal itemizers did not substantially alter our 
results). Third, the use of average taxable income to arrive at a tax rate may not be appropriate if most 
contributions come from wealthy individuals. Finally, the tax price evaluated at taxable income 
represents the price of the last dollar of contributions. Although this rate is the appropriate opportunity 
cost of marginal contributions, it may not be strictly exogenous (Reece and Zieschang, 1985). 
12. The use of the maximum rates essentially eliminates the need to choose between married-joint and 
single rates because, with the exception of Kansas, these rates are identical for both filing statuses 
(although the income level at which this rate takes effect may differ). 
13. Fixed effects procedures produce consistent estimates under more general conditions than do random 
effects procedures. Unfortunately, our data do not contain enough longitudinal variation to generate 
meaningful fixed effects results—e.g., estimates (and standard errors) of the income and price 
coefficients from a fixed effects model similar to the fourth specification in Table 3 are 0.234 (0.702) 
and —0.369 (3.434), respectively. A Hausman test based on the economic coefficients rejects the 
random effects assumptions at a marginal significance level (p value = 0.09). Given the imprecision of 
the fixed effects estimates and the weak rejection of the random effects assumptions, we have chosen to 
report only the random effects results in the tables. 
14. Reestimates of Table 3 based on unweighted state-level data produce similar estimates of income 
elasticities and stronger estimates of price elasticities. 
15. We performed several other sensitivity analyses using the 1989-90 data. First, we reexamined the results 
from Tables 3 and 4 excluding possible outliers (e.g., excluding the six observations that had log 
contributions outside the interval —1.0 to 0.75) and found that these exclusions had no demonstrable ef-
fect on our estimates. Second, we experimented with alternative functional specifications of the 
regression equation, which relaxed the assumption of isoelastic price and income responses. Random 
effects estimates based on a fully linear model generated income and price elasticities at the observation 
means of 1.219 and —2.005, respectively. The corresponding elasticities from a random effects model 
with log dependent and linear independent variables were 1.479 and —1.679. 
16. Each of the single-year OLS specifications includes sociopolitical controls and region dummies. A 
comparison of results with and without the regional variables reveals that the dummies' inclusion has 
only modest effects on the economic coefficient estimates and standard errors. 
17. Two of the organizations are closely affiliated with specific religious denominations; for these groups, 
the fraction of denomination members in each states population is added to the standard set of 
demographic and attitudinal controls. While there are other religiously oriented charities among the six 
remaining IRDOs, none is affiliated with a particular denomination. 
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